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THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN ADMINISTRATION'S 
MAINLAND POLICY: TOWARD A MODUS VIVENDI 
OR CONTINUED STALEMATE? 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
University of Richmond 
Abstract 
This article discusses the main elements of the Chen 
Shui-bian administration's cross-Strait policy, analyzes the 
policy's key domestic and international determinants, and 
offers a preliminary assessment on the policy. Chen's cross-
Strait policy adheres to Taiwan's "economic security" 
approach to national security. Whereas the previous Lee 
administration sought to safeguard national security by 
reducing economic dependence on the mainland, Chen's 
policy strives to normalize cross-Strait economic relations 
as an important pillar to peace and stability in the Taiwan 
Strait. Although Chen has accelerated his political matura-
tion, his China policy continues to be constrained by vari-
ous factors (most importantly, the PRC's insistence on a 
"one China" precondition for cross-Strait talks) and has 
succeeded more in reducing tensions and maintaining the 
status quo than in reaching a modus vivendi with the main-
land. A benign stalemate without imminent military threat 
has ensued. Diplomatic setbacks, electoral considerations, 
and growing frustration with Beijing's spuming of his good 
will led Chen to move toward to a hardened position, such 
as his "Taiwan and China, each side is a country across the 
Taiwan Strait" formula in August 2002. 
92 
The March 18, 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, offi-
cially known as the Republic of China (ROC), marked an 
important milestone in the island republic's democratic devel-
opment and its relationship with the People's Republic of 
China (PRC or China). It was only the second time that ROC 
citizens had directly elected their chief of state.' Chen Shui-
bian, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) candidate and a 
former mayor of Taipei, won by a plurality of 39 percent, 
defeating the independent candidate James Soong (37 per-
cent), a former governor of Taiwan Province who left the 
KMT or Kuomintang (the party that once was the ruling party 
of all China and then of Taiwan for fifty-five years), and the 
KMT-nominated incumbent, Vice President Lien Chan (23 
percent). The election, characterized as competitive, free, and 
fair, also resulted in the KMT's loss of the presidency for the 
first time. The first peaceful transfer of executive power in any 
ethnic Chinese society confirmed Taiwan's progress toward 
democratic consolidation. 
However, Chen's victory also posed challenges for cross-
Strait relations. The PRC felt threatened by Taiwan's deepen-
ing democratization, which the PRC viewed as contributing to 
Taiwan's growing independence, and intensely distrusted 
Chen's party and him personally. Chen's ascendance inaugu-
rated a new epoch in Taiwan's political genealogy. Although 
he was the second, not the first, native Taiwanese to become 
the ROC president,2 he was the first born after Taiwan had 
split from the mainland after 19493 Chen used to be an ardent 
supporter of Taiwan's independence and the leader of a party 
l The first democratic presidential election was held in March 1996. In a 
four-way race, the incumbent, Lee Teng-hui, who also was the chainnan of the 
KMT, won by a landslide. 
2 The ftrst Taiwan native to become the ROC president was Lee Teng-hui 
(1988-2000). 
-' Chen Shui-bian was born on February 18, 1951, to a poor pcas.ant family 
in Tainan County. Richard C'. Kagan. Chen Shui-bian: Building a Community 
and a Nation (Taipei: Asia-Pacific Academic Exchange Foundation, 2000). 31. 
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whose platform called for it.4 Thus, the PRC long has 
regarded the DPP and Chen with great suspicion. But as the 
DPP and Chen came close to power, pragmatism gradually 
replaced realism. Although not abandoning its principled 
stance on Taiwan's status, the DPP proclaimed in its 2000 elec-
tion platform that "Taiwan should also seek to normalize ties 
with China as its long-term goal."' To use political scientist 
Robert D. Putnam's "two-level game" analogy,6 Chen's new 
pragmatic middle course reflected the delicate balance of 
achieving a simultaneous equilibrium between an external 
game and an internal game. The external game called for a 
policy appearing nonproactive to the PRC and also acceptable 
to the US, whose support was crucial to Taiwan's security. The 
internal game called for a policy representing the largest com-
mon denominator among the various DPP factions and oppo-
sition parties. 
This essay examines the main elements of the Chen Shui-
bian administration's cross-Strait policy (in contrast to that of 
the preceding Lee Teng-hui administration), analyzes the key 
domestic and international factors that shape the policy, and 
provides a preliminary assessment of the policy. It finds that 
Chen's cross-Strait policy exemplifies Taiwan's "economic 
security" approach to national security. However, its premise 
concerning the impact of economic interdependence on 
national security is the reverse of the Lee administration's: 
4 The DPP program states: "Taiwan's sovereignty is separate from and 
does not belong to the People's Republic of China. Nor does Taiwan's 
sovereignty extend to the Chinese mainland. These are both historical facts and 
actual reality.'' The program calls for "establishing an independent country in 
accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, enacting a new constitution 
... and turning to the international society based on principles of international 
law.'' Democratic Progressive Pony Basic Program (in Chinese), available at 
<http://ncwcongress.yam.org.tw/dpp/programme.htm>. 
' Democratic Progressive Party, DPP Year 2000 Policy Manifesto: Our 
Vision for a New Era (Taipei: Demtx:ratic Progressive Party Headquarters, 
2000). 72. 
6 Robert D. Putnam, ''Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: 111e Logic of 
1\vo-Level Games," International Organization 42 (Summer 1988): 427-60. 
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whereas Lee sought to safeguard national security by reducing 
economic dependence on the mainland, Chen's policy strives 
to normalize cross-Strait economic relations as an important 
pillar to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. However. 
constrained by various factors, including the PRC's insistence 
on a "one China" precondition for cross-Strait talks, the policy 
hitherto has succeeded more in reducing tensions and main-
taining the status quo than in reaching a modus vivendi with 
the mainland. Pragmatic economic opening to the mainland, 
despite the lack of a formal agreement, has combined with 
China's own need for a stable external environment to contrib-
ute to reducing tensions across the Strait. A benign stalemate 
over the "one China" issue has ensued, but there is no immi-
nent military threat. 
Destabilizing "One China" 
Touted by some analysts as the magic formula to allow the 
various players in the cross-Strait relationship to politically 
manage this potentially volatile issue, "one China" now has 
become an apparent obstacle in the cross-Strait relationship. 
To understand this evolution, a little background on "one 
China" is necessary. 
The PRC defines "one China" as a principle-a nonnegoti-
able position that the other side first must accept before any 
negotiation can begin and also a logical premise from which all 
subsequent PRC claims or demands will be derived. Scholars 
who have studied Chinese negotiating behavior point out that, 
once the other party agrees to Beijing's principled stance, most 
likely from a desire to move the talks along, the PRC then 
holds the other party responsible for fulfilling its obligations 
under the agreement, as defined by Beijing, and pressures the 
previously identified interlocutor ("old friend") to deliver7 
7 See Richard H. Solomon, The Chinese Negotiating Behavior 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 1999). 
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For example, until recently, the standard PRC syllogism 
regarding the cross-Strait relationship had been: 
There is only one China; 
Taiwan is a part of China; 
The PRC is the legal government of all China; 
(It then follows that Taiwan is a part of the PRC)-" 
This formula oversimplifies a complex issue and does not 
accord with the realities that the ROC predates the PRC, has 
been in existence since 1912, and that the PRC never has gov-
erned Taiwan, even for a day." Nevertheless, the PRC has 
attempted tirelessly to enshrine this syllogism in all key diplo-
matic documents. for example, the three communiques with 
the US (1972. 1978. and 1982), and the many other communi-
ques signed with other countries upon establishment of diplo-
matic relations. 
X To make acceptance of il<> "one China" principle easier for Taiwan while 
maintaining its basic stance, the PRC' refonnulated a new syllogism, as 
represented by Vice Pn:mier Qian Qichen's rendition in January 2001, aimed at 
the incoming Bush administration and repeated henceforth: 
There is only one China; 
Both Taiwan and the mainland belong to the same China; 
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be divided. 
See John Pomfret, "Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan," Washington Post, 
January 5, 2001. p. A I. While telling Taiwan that "anything (could] be discussed" 
once Taiwan had accepted the "one China" principle, Qian pointed out that this 
rendition was for "internal" consumption (for Taiwan) only, and did not signal 
any change on the external front-that is, Beijing still insists upon its "one 
China" principle: however. it can be stated differently in different contexts (vi!>-3-
vis Taiwan or other states) [neiwai youbieJ. 
" A recent article in the influential American Journal of International Law 
opines, "International legal right., should reflect current realities and avoid 
anachronistic situations . the passage of time and actualities of [Taiwan's] 
independence [from the PRCJ for over SO years should have legal effects." And 
it further points out that "Taiwan satisfies all the generally accepted criteria for 
statehood ... and today even a non-state entity may hold territory ... and the 
population of a territory may have right<; of self-determination that deny the 
sovereign state the unqualified authority to control that territory and its 
population." Jonathan J. Charney and J.R. Prescott, "Resolving Cross-Strait 
Relations he tween China and T<tiwan," American JournaL of lnternnciona! Law 94 
(July 21X)()): 4n1-S. 471. 477. 
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Whereas other states may choose to carry on a prudential 
policy by giving diplomatic recognition to Beijing based on 
their own national interests, agreeing to this syllogism as 
Beijing interprets it has interfered with their other interests, 
such as maintaining cordial and prosperous ties with Taiwan 
and preventing China from attacking Taiwan in the name of 
"internal affairs"~an event fraught with international 
consequences. 
For example, in the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the US 
avowed a much more nuanced "one China" position, which 
was to guide the US policy for the next. thirty years: 
The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government 
does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in 
a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves (emphasis added). 10 
In essence, the US simply normalized relations with Beijing 
on a basis that both sides of the Taiwan Strait hitherto could 
agree on ·'one China," although they obviously disagreed on 
who represented China. The US, while refraining from defin-
ing what this "China" means (culturally or politically), insists 
upon a process of conflict resolution (peaceful settlement), but 
does not necessarily endorse any particular outcome (e.g., 
peaceful reunification, as Beijing demands), 11 as long as it has, 
in the words of President Bill Clinton, "the assent of the peo-
ple of Taiwan." 12 
!O For the text of the wmmunique, see Harry Harding, A FragiLe 
Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington: Brookings, 
19'!2). Appendix B. 
11 The importance of this distinction is driven home by the question posed 
by a Tsinghua University student to President George W. Bush, during his 2002 
visit to Beijing. This student wanted to know "why Bush did not use the tenn 
'reunification' when he spoke about China and Taiwan and stuck to 
'resolution.''' John Pomfret, "After Listening to Bush, Chinese Wait to Be 
Heard," Washington Post. February 23, 2002, p. Al2. 
12 In a speech given at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 
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This illustration emphasizes that the US has been carrying 
on a dynamic "one China" policy that calibrates with changing 
circumstances and interests, rather than employing an immuta-
ble principle. Although a full treatment of this point is beyond 
the scope of this essay, the essence of it applies to the third 
player in the cross-Strait relationship, namely Taiwan. 
There are multiple voices in Taiwan on the issue of "one 
China." A succinct summary can be made by comparing the 
omitted tenses of "one China" held by each major party. This 
illustration shows that semantic omission on the tense of the 
seemingly innocuous "one China" formula belies fundamental 
differences. As can be inferred from the analysis above, for 
the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP), "one China" refers to 
the present tense. However, none of the major parties in 
Taiwan subscribes to this view. For the New Party (NP), "one 
China" means the progressive tense; for the KMT, the future 
tense; and for the DPP, the past tenseY Table 1 is a stylized 
comparison of the parties' many stances on "one China." 
As can be seen from this table, the three major parties in 
Taiwan's 2000 presidential race shared a high degree of con-
sensus on cross-Strait issues. Formally, they disagreed on what 
the final outcome should be-the KMT and the New Party 
espoused eventual unification of Taiwan with the mainland, 
and the DPP advocated eventual de jure independence of 
International Studies on March 8, 20CO, which paved the way to grant PNTR to 
the PRC. President Clinton declared that the United States would "continue to 
reject the use of force as a means to resolve the Taiwan question, making 
ahsolutely clear that the issues hetween Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved 
peacefully and with the a"-'ient of the people of Taiwan." This formula became a 
new administration policy. Jay Hancock, "Ointon Talks Up Trade Ties to China; 
Stabilizing Benefits of Admitting Beijing to WTO Are Stressed; 'Significant 
Opportunity,'" Baltimore Sun, March 9, 2000, p. Al, and Robert G. Kaiser and 
Steven Mufson, "Crisis in the Making? Experts Differ on Whether Rising 
Tensions Will Lead to a IJ.S.-China Clash." Washington Post, March 16, 2000, 
p. A22. 
lJ "Yizhung er-an shulaibao" (One China. two sides wunting rap), China 
Times Online, retrieved December 28, 2000 <http://forums.ehinatimes.wm.tw/ 
special/wun t/china.h tm>. 
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Table 1. "One China," Many Versions-Is Troth in tbe Eye 
of tbe Beholder? 
CCP KMT NP DPP 
The tense of Present-There Future-China Progressive- Past-Taiwan 
"nne China" is only one is currently the two sides has been saver-
China. divided, hut should com- eign and inde-
should be uni- mence unifica- pendent from 
fied in the tion talks China since 
future (cf. l'l49 
National Unifi-
cation Guide-
lines) 
Taiwan's status Taiwan is a part Taiwan is a part Taiwan is a part Taiwan does 
vis-a-vis China of China; Qian: of C'hina, but of China, but not belong to 
One China Taiwan and the Taiwan and the the PRC, and 
includes both mainland mainland Taiwan's sover-
the mainland should tmjoy should enjoy eignty does not 
and Taiwan equal status equal status extend to the 
mainland 
How many Only one: Acknowledge- Acknowledge- Beijing is the 
legal govern- Beijing ment of two ment of two government of 
ment<>? governments governments the PRC; Taipei 
before unifica- before unifica- is the govern-
tion tion ment of Taiw<~n 
Who represents Beijing Taipei Taipei Taipei 
Taiwan people 
internationally? 
Unification One country, Confederation European Rejects unifica-
proposal two systems model tion, seeks tie 
jure indepen-
dence; may 
consider some 
type of "'Politi-
cal inte ration"' 
Taiwan. But the issues on which they agreed were much more 
important: (1) no party backed immediate or rapid unification 
of Taiwan with the mainland, as long as the PRC remained a 
one-party dictatorship; (2) all favored maintaining the status 
quo (in effect de facto indepedence) before their preferred 
eventual outcome could be realized; and (3) no party would 
agree to sacrifice Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy when 
dealing with the PRC (e.g .• accepting the PRC's "one country, 
two systems" unification proposal, under which Taiwan would 
enjoy a Hong Kong-style "high degree of autonomy" with 
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Beijing's blessing). 14 That is why the election focused more on 
domestic issues, such as anticorruption, than on cross-Strait 
issues. Maintaining the status quo, rather than pursuing either 
rash unification or independence, is the modal position in 
Taiwan's political spectrum on national identity, as corrobo-
rated by most survey results. For example, a July 2001 survey, 
commissioned by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, found 
that 53.6 percent of the respondents were "pro-status quo," 20 
percent were "pro-unification,'' and 16.6 percent were "pro-
independence."" 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the positions of 
the most fervent parties in table I also are the farthest apart. 
The DPP prefers de jure independence, but will settle for de 
facto independence if de jure independence risks almost cer-
tain military action by China. Regardless of the wishes of the 
people of Taiwan, the CCP is unwavering on unification of 
Taiwan with the mainland on Beijing's terms, preferably 
through peaceful means, but by force if necessary. It is espe-
cially concerned about the increasingly open talks of indepen-
dence in Taiwan's vibrant democracy. Hence, Beijing always 
has insisted on the "one China" principle as a precondition to 
cross-Strait talks. 
14 The political realignment after the 2()X) election resulted in two 
ideologically distinct groupings: The People First Party (PFP), founded by James 
Soong, joined the KMT and the NP to form the pro-unification Pan-Blue 
Coalition. whereas a new Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), founded by former 
president, Lee Teng-hui, joined the DPP to form the pro-independence Pan-
Green Coalition. 
1.~ The studies commissioned by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council contain 
six response categories. as can be found in MAC's earlier data presentations. In 
the July 2001 study, "status quo now/ decision later" (32.1 percent) and "status 
quo indefinitely" (21.5 percent) are now reclassified as "pro-status quo"; "status 
quo now, reunification later" (16.7 percent) and "reunification asasp" (3.3 
percent) are now reclassified as ''pro-reunification"; and "status quo now I 
independence later" (10.2 percent) and "independence asap'' (6.4 percent) are 
now reclassified as "pro-independence." Cf. "Unification or [ndependence," 
available at <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/p90Cl7e.htm>: <http://www. 
mac.gov. tw/cnglish/POS/9007 /9())7e_l.gif>. 
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Beijing maintains that, in 1992, the two semi-official orga-
nizations authorized to conduct cross-Strait negotiations, 
Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), 
reached an agreement on the issue of "one China." Although 
the KMT, then in power but now in opposition, admits that an 
agreement on "one China" exists, its interpretation is quite 
different from Beijing's. 
The two sides do not agree about the 1992 formula, "yige 
zhongguo, gezi biaoshu"' (one China, each side's own state-
ment). Beijing insists that the formula meant "each side, 
through verbal means, expresses its insistence of one China 
(gebiao yizhong)." In contrast, the KMT says that it meant 
"one China, each side has its own meaning (yizhong gebiao ). " 
Evidently, the formula was an agreement to disagree 16-a 
modus operandi that enabled the two sides to move forward in 
their dialogue, resulting in the 1993 historic talk between the 
two agencies' chiefsP 
Among the three major candidates in the 2000 presidential 
election, Chen appeared to be the least favored by Beijing. 
Because of the DPP's pro-independence platform, Beijing had 
great mistrust toward the DPP and Chen personally. Four 
weeks prior to the election, on February 21, 2000, Beijing 
issued a white paper that declared a new condition for using 
force against Taiwan: if Taiwan refuses, sine die, peaceful uni-
fication through negotiations (the two old "ifs" were declara-
tion of independence by Taiwan or foreign occupation of 
Taiwan)." Just days before the election, Chinese Premier Zhu 
16 Alan M. Wachman, Challenges and Opportunities in the Taiwan Strait: 
Defming America's Role. Conference Report (New York: National Committee 
on United States-China Relations, 2000), 23. 
17 The Chen Shui-bian administration disavows that there ever was an 
inked agreement in 1992; instead, it refers to a "1992 spirit" (reCDnciliation by 
agreeing to disagree), rather than a "1992 agreement." 
HI The State C-Ouncil, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue White 
Paper, February 21, 2000, available at <bttp://gptaiwan.org.tw/-cylin!China/2000/ 
200Q_2_21.htm>. 
101 
Rongji went on television to sternly warn Taiwan voters 
against choosing Chen lest they lose their chance to vote. 
However, Beijing's "paper missile" and Zhu's finger-wagging 
backfired. A split between Lien and Soong and popular 
fatigue with the KMT led to Chen's narrow victory. Stunned 
by Chen's victory. the PRC initially was paralyzed over how to 
respond. Warned that military actions against Taiwan would 
jeopardize its chance of receiving permanent normal trading 
relations (PNTR) from the US Congress, Beijing decided to 
exert political pressure on Chen, but not force. It insisted that 
Chen first had to accept the "one China" principle was a pre-
condition (qianti) before cross-Strait dialogue could begin-a 
policy known as "listening to (his) words and watching (his) 
actions (tingqiyan, guanqixing)." 
For his part, knowing how fragile his presidency would be 
and faced with a potentially serious external security threat 
and a hostile legislature controlled by the opposition party, 
Chen struck a conciliatory tone. He billed himself as Taiwan's 
"Richard Nixon," someone with unquestionable qualifications 
(loyalty to Taiwan) to improve cross-Strait relations, and 
offered to make a journey of peace to the mainland. He said 
that the two sides should resume talks without preconditions 
and that he was willing to discuss "one China" as a topic (yiti) 
in cross-Strait talks, but he maintained that he could not 
accept "one China., as a precondition as Beijing defined it. 
Hence, the two sides remain deadlocked over the "one China" 
issue, despite their evidently mutually beneficial economic 
relationship. 
Evolution of Chen's Cross-Strait Policy 
Table 2 provides a succinct timeline of the most important 
events, policies, or announcements regarding cross-Strait pol-
icy since Chen Shui-bian's March 18,2000 electoral victory. In 
the twenty-two months from March 2000 to January 2002, 
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Chen's cross-Strait policy can be analyzed in three distinct 
stages, each with complex determinants and objectives, but all 
with an overall goal of reducing tensions and maintaining sta-
bility across the Taiwan Strait. 
Table 2. Timeline of Chen's Cross-Strait Policy 
2000 
Mardi 18 
Taiwan held its second direct popular presidential election. Chen Shui-bian, the can-
didate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidency with a plurality 
of 39.3 percent, marking the first peaceful transfer of executive power. The Kuomin-
tang (KMT) was defeated for the first time in fifty-five years. The election results 
took the PRC by surprise. Beijing announced that it would "listen to his (Chen's) 
words and watch his deeds." 
May 20 
In his inaugural speech, Chen declared the conditional '"'five no's": As long as the 
CCP regime had no intention to use military force against Taiwan, he pledged that 
during his term in office, he would not 
• declare independence 
• change the national title 
push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the 
Constitution 
• promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to independence or unifi-
cation, or 
• aholish the Guidelines for National Unification or the National Unification 
Council. 
November 
A task force proposed to Chen its conclusions-"three acknowledgements, four rec-
ommendations." It advised Chen to respond to the PRC's "one China" demand in 
accordance 'Nith the ROC's Constitution, a one-China document (because the ROC 
existed before the PRC). 
2001 
JaniOIU')' 1 
The 1hree Mini-Links policy was inaugurated, which established the first direct ship-
ping and transport links since 1949 between the two Taiwan-controlled offshore 
islands, Quemoy and Matzu, and Xiamen and Fuzhou in the PRC. 
In his New Year's address, President Chen urged Otinese leaders to renounce the usc 
of force against Taiwan and allow Taiwan to raise its international proftlc so the two 
sides could establish a new framework for political integration. 
April 
Midair collision between a Chinese fighter and a US Navy reconnaissance plane. 
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US President George W. Bush, in a TV interview, declared that the US would "do 
whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a military attack by 
China. 
President Bush approved the sale of a robust package of arms to Taiwan. 
May 
President Chen made hi.-; second overseas trip, making "transit" stops in Los Angeles, 
New York, and Houston, meeting two dozen American lawmakers while en route to 
Central America. 
In Guatemala. Chen enunciated his second "five no's," aimed at assuaging Beijing's 
backla.o;h against his .. transit" through the US and Washington's arms sales to Taiwan. 
Taiwan's recent arms purchases and his travel to the US were not intended to 
provoke Beijing 
• Taiwan would not misjudge or miscalculate the current state of cross-Strait 
relations 
• Taiwan was not a vassal state or pawn of the United States 
Taiwan would not cease in its efforts to improve relations with the PRC 
Taiwan was a sovereign state and would not become a pawn in power politics. 
Aup!t26 
1be 120-member Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) decided to 
replace the "no haste, be patient" policy, which put a US$50 million cap on any single 
investment in the mainland. with the new policy of "active opening, effective manage-
ment," in an effort to build a more stable cross-Strait trading environment. The Chen 
administration embraced the EDAC's recommendations. 
September 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) cleared the way for China and Taiwan to enter 
the trade body in its November meeting in Qatar. 
'lhe A-.ia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum's meetings were held in 
Shanghai. Beijing refused Chen's choice of Lee Yuan-tzu, a former ROC vice presi-
dent. as his "representative" at the APEC summit, resulting in Taiwan's absence from 
the summit. 
October 10 
In his National Day address. President Chen Shui-bian said that Thiwan would make 
more effort to normalize relations with mainland China. 
No~ember 
Taiwan lifted longtime restrictions on direct investment in China, scrapping the US$50 
million limit on individual investments in China, automatically approving projects of 
less than US$20 million. and allowing Taiwanese banks to transfer money directly to 
and from Chinese banks through speciaJ offices or offshore accounts. This signified 
the end of the "no haste, be patient" policy, enacted in 1996. 
The WTO formally approved the accessions of China and Taiwan. Analysts believe 
that thL: WfO may provide to the PRC and the ROC a venue for healthy interactions 
or diplomatic wrangling. 
December 
Chen's DPP won important victories in the parliamentary elections, becoming the 
largest party in the Legislative Yuan. 
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Taiwan declared the Three Mini-Links a success and extended the policy for another 
year. 
2002 
January 
Taiwan allowed the first group of mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. 
Taiwan opened its doors to more than 2.00CI products from (]tina in a bid to dampen 
the row over adding "issued in Taiwan" on ROC passport<;. 
Source: Author's compilation 
March 2000-Janunry 2001: Stabilizing a Volatile Relationship 
Different parties greeted the election results with different 
reactions. Whereas undoubtedly some DPP fundamentalists 
viewed Chen's victory as a mandate to further push for inde-
pendence, many others worried about Beijing's reactions. 
Chen's election victory also presented a fresh diplomatic chal-
lenge to the US, which was concerned about rash actions 
either by the victorious DPP or by the impatient Beijing 
regime that could escalate cross-Strait tensions and embroil it 
in unwanted hostilities. Despite publicly praising Taiwan's 
maturing democracy, the US worked behind the scenes to 
defuse a potentially volatile situation by dispatching envoys to 
Taipei and Beijing to reiterate basic US policies and 
interests. 19 
These pressures from various sides-DPP ideologues, 
KMT sceptics, Beijing hardliners, and American inter-
mediaries-presented Chen with a delicate balancing act: how 
to stabilize cross-Strait relations but still preserve all options 
19 After the election. the Clinton administration sent Lee Hamilton, the 
respected fonncr chairman of the US House of Representatives' Committee on 
International Relations. to Taiwan. Hamilton returned to the US with much 
more a~surance. ln addition, Raymond Burghardt, Director of the American 
Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial US "embassy" in Taiwan. reportedly met Chen 
several times after the election and contributed some input to Chen's inaugural 
speech. 
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for dealing with Beijing in the future. His first task was to gain 
credibility. 
In his inaugural speech, Chen promised that, as long as the 
CCP regime had no intention to use military force against 
Taiwan. during his term in office, he would not declare inde-
pendence, change the national title, push forth the inclusion of 
the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution, 
nor promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard 
to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, 
there would be no question of abolishing the Guidelines for 
National Unification or the National Unification Council.20 
These concessions were collectively known as his first "five 
no's." Chen argued that his conciliatory speech won trust 
from the US government and avoided giving the PRC any pre-
text to attack Taiwan. 
In November, a task force called by Chen proposed to him 
the so-called "three acknowledgements" and "four recommen-
dations." which amounted to minimal "common denomina-
tors" among the various voices in Taiwan. The task force 
advised Chen to respond to the PRC's "one-China" demand in 
accordance with the ROC's Constitution-a one-China 
document.21 
Then, in his New Year address on January 1, 2001, Chen 
urged Chinese leaders to renounce the use of force against 
Taiwan and to allow the island to raise its international profile 
so the two sides could establish a "new framework for political 
integration (zhengzhi tonghe)."22 Chen's advisers added that 
2o Chen Shui-hian. ''Taiwan Stand.<.; llp" (presidential inaugural speech), 
May 20, 2000, available at <http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2{XX)/dow_2.htm>. 
21 This constitution was promulgated in 1947 when the KMT still ruled all 
China and before the PRC was founded in 1949. Thus. adhering to it would 
imply that Taipei's "one China" refers to a unified China that existed in the past 
under KMT rule, and. while it is presently divided, Taiwan does not rule out a 
future unified China with Beijing. For details, see "One China. Two Sides 
Counting Rap." Chilw Times Online. 
22 Associated Press, "Taiwan President Seeks China Peace," New York 
Times, Dcccmher 31. 2()(X). 
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the concept of political integration could include, but was not 
necessarily the same as, unification?3 But some analysts argue 
that Chen actually proposed a European-style process of eco-
nomic integration, with spillover to the political realm. In 
other words, Chen's formula assumed that unification of 
Taiwan with the mainland was one, but not the only, choice, 
and that integration presupposed normalization of economic 
ties-his main objectives in the second period (see below). 
Chen's approach appeared also to have been inspired by 
the reconciliation experience between the two parties of other 
divided nations, particularly the June 2000 summit between 
the leaders of South and North Korea. Table 3 compares the 
dynamics of the three most notable divided nations after 
World War II: Germany, Korea, and China. It shows that size 
asymmetry, regime asymmetry, and Beijing's Hallsteinian doc-
trine on "one China" have contributed to the comparatively 
underdeveloped reconciliation between the PRC and the 
ROC24 
From an advocate of Taiwan's independence. to the cau-
tious wordsmith arguing "independence is not the only 
choice." to the bold politician proposing an integrative politi-
cal framework with the rival PRC, Chen has accelerated his 
political maturation. 
Although cross-Strait relations remained in a stalemate fol-
lowing Chen's inauguration, mainly due to the two sides' 
impasse over the "one China" issue, tensions between Taiwan 
23 For three useful elaborations on Chen's "political integration" theory, 
see Steve Tsang, "Proposals and Prospect of Cross-Strait Integration" (in 
Chinese), China Times (online). September 25, 2001, available at <http://www. 
future-china.org/spcl_rpt/vote2000/cn2bian_rnnu.htm>: Chang Ya-chung, "Cross-
Strait Integration: The 'Whole China' and the Establishment of the 'Third 
Entity' " (in Chinese), September 29, 2001, available at <http://www.future-china. 
org/spcl_rpt/vote2000/cn2bian_rnnu.btm>; and Shen Fu-hsiung, "Chen's 'One 
Country, Two Countries,'" Taipei Times, September 10, 2001. 
24 For more details, sec Thn-jcn Cheng and Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, 
"Between Convergence and Collision: Whither Cross-Strait Relations?" 
Camhri.dge Review of International Affairs 14 (April 2001 ): 239-511. 
Table 3. Divided Nations: Comparative Dynamisms 
Ge"""'?' (FRG/GDR) Koreas (ROK/DPRK) Chinas (ROC/PRC) 
1~ 1974 1990 1954 1974 2000 1954 1974 2000 
Political Relatiolls 
Cross-Recognition No Yes Yes No No Flux No No No 
Permanent Representatives No Yes Yes No No No No No No 
High-Level Contacts No Yes Yes No Yes• Yes No No Flux 
United Nations Membership No l'llnollel l'anlllel No No Pwallel YesROL Yes Pit( YesrRc 
Erot10mic Relatiou 
Trade Ties Yes Yes Yes No No Yes* No No Yes• 
Cross Investments No No Yes No No Yeo* No No Yes• 
Direct Transport Flux Yes Yes No No No No No Flux 
Bank Loans No No Yes No No Yes* No No No 
Seanity Asperts 
Foreign Defense Treaty No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Foreign Troop Presence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Nuclear Wea.pons No No No No No Yes*0 PRJ( No YesrRc Yesl'R< 
Nonaggression Pact Flux Yes Yes No No Flux No No No 
SucW/Humanirarian Aspects 
Telephone Ties Flux Yes Yes No No Yes• No Yes* Yes• 
Postal Links Yes Yes Yes No No Yes• No Yes* Yes• 
Monetary Convertibility No Yes• Yes* No No Yes• No No Yes• 
Family!fourist Visits Flux Yes Yes No No Yeo No No y~oc 
# of integrative forces 2 II 13 0 1 9 0 1 6 
RESULT (as of 2000) Unification Division Division 
Notes: Iatexrative forces are in bold face. Yes* denotes a de facto but unofficial relationship. 
Source: Authors· update and adaptation of John J. Metzler. Divided Dynamism: The Diplomacy uf Separated Nutium-Germany. Kurea, China 
(Lanham. MD: University Press of America. 1996). 203-6. 
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and China quickly subsided and there was no threat of a mili-
tary crisis. Instead, the PRC adopted a policy of forming a 
united front with Taiwan's opposition parties and business 
leaders to isolate and weaken Chen's administration. 
January-September 2001: Toward Normalization of 
Economic Relations 
Recognizing that its traditional tactics of military intimida-
tion, diplomatic isolation, and condescending proposal for 
peaceful unification had produced few concrete results in 
enticing Taiwan to start reunification talks with the mainland, 
Beijing adopted an interrelated two-pronged new policy: build 
a united front and create economic interdependence. While 
the former efforts had failed, as evidenced by the December 
2001 legislative election (discussed below), the latter strategy 
began to show some results. 
Beijing initially chose to ignore Chen Shui-bian. This pos-
ture reflected Beijing's tested negotiating strategm (what 
James Mann, a respected China-watcher, called "Show Us 
That You Care"),25 and revealed Beijing's deep disappoint-
ment at Chen's victory. But more importantly, it showed that 
Beijing assumed that Chen, winning with a slim plurality and 
challenged by a legislature led by the hostile KMT, would be 
weak and not last long. Therefore, Beijing felt that it could 
afford to wait out Chen's four-year term and deal with a suc-
cessor who was more acceptable from its standpoint (e.g., 
James Soong). 
Refusing to deal with the Chen administration directly, 
Beijing began to actively court Taiwan's opposition parties to 
build a united front to further pressure and isolate the Chen 
administration. Heavyweights from the KMT, NP, People's 
First Party (a party formed by Soong after the election), and 
2.5 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship 
with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage, 2000), 88. 
109 
even some moderate leaders of the DPP were given red-carpet 
treatment, whereas the SEF-ARATS channel was totally 
bypassed. 
Beijing's united front strategy extended beyond the politi-
cal establishment to the economic realm. China's leaders now 
realized that the growing economic interdependence across 
the Taiwan Strait (and particularly Taiwan's growing depen-
dence on the mainland for cheap labor and land amid the 
island's worst economic downturn since the first oil crisis) 
might prove to be the most important material foundation for 
political integration. As one analyst points out, the bur-
geoning people-to-people and commercial ties across the 
Taiwan Strait have challenged government policy to keep pace 
with the commercial reality26 Table 4 (page 324) shows that 
cross-Strait trade (still technically indirect trade via third 
places like Hong Kong) in 2000 reached over US$30 billion. 
Taiwan had become a very important "foreign" investor in 
China. In 2000, 13.9 percent of all PRC foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) projects were attributed to Taiwanese investors. 
In fact, during the two first decades following the initiation of 
China's open door policy (1979-2000), Taiwan was responsible 
for the second largest number of FDI projects in the PRC, the 
third highest amount of contracted FDI, and the fourth highest 
amount of utilized FDJ.27 Taiwan's outward (mainly west-
ward) investments provided a powerful boost to China's 
export boom in the 1990s, fulfilling the dictates of globaliza-
tion. Remarkably, these significant cross-Strait trade and 
investment flows occurred despite a lack of formal agreements 
between the two sides. 
The magnitude of Taiwan's growing economic ties to 
China, coupled with the fact that China is Taiwan's main secur-
ity threat, has far-reaching and paradoxical implications for 
2o Karen M. Sutter, "Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait: New 
Considerations for Cross-Strait Relations," The Virginia Review of Asian Studies 
3 (Fall 2001). 63-77. 
27 Ibid .. 68. 
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Taiwan's security and has sparked policy and scholarly 
debates. Constrained by diplomatic isolation and military 
threat imposed by the PRC, Taiwan always has relied on an 
economic approach to its national security. "Economic secur-
ity" manifests itself in many aspects of the island's external 
conduct: Taiwan has become a key trader and source of high-
tech goods in the global supply chain;2' promotes "substantive 
diplomacy," anchored on economic relations, to circumvent 
the imposed limits to its role in conventional diplomacy; and 
has joined economic intergovernmental organizations in which 
Taiwan's economic strength can be recognized, e.g., the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). 
However, on the issue of whether cross-Strait economic 
relations will contribute or undermine Taiwan's security. there 
are differences in opinion. One school of thought sees 
Taiwan's growing economic dependence on the mainland as 
inimical to Taiwan's security. because this dependence threat-
ens Beijing's undue leverage over Taipei. Former president 
Lee Teng-hui subscribes to this school. In 1996, he devised the 
policy of "no haste, be patient" Uieji yongren ), which limited 
any single investment project to US$50 million or less and 
restricted investments in certain key sectors. Lee's policy 
sought to make cross-Strait economic ties subordinate to 
cross-Strait security and turned against the tide.2" Albeit not 
2il The most articulate example along this vein is the so-called ''silicon 
shield" thesis, which states that due to Taiwan's importance in the global 
semiconductor market-a fact made painfully clear after Taiwan's deva<;;tating 
earthquake in September 1W9-Taiwan's security can be secured by virtue of a 
''silicon shield," meaning the major industrial democracies that also are heavy 
consumers of information products will resist a PRC attack, just like they rallied 
to intervene to liberate Kuwait from Iraq's occupation. Sec Craig Addison, "A 
'Silicon Shield' Protects Taiwan from China,'' International Herald Tribune, 
September 29, 2()(X), p. 6. 
2ll Lee ·s policy ha'> some theoretical support. 'The cross~Strait relationship 
contain~ only one pillar of the Kantian Peace (i.e .. economic interdependence), 
while lacking the other two (i.e., both Taiwan and China are democratic and both 
arc constrained hy international organizations and law). Historically. economic 
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without theoretical support, this policy became increasingly 
infeasible and counterproductive when cross-Strait economic 
interdependence continued to grow and Taiwanese investors 
easily evaded the single-project investment cap by creative 
expediencies. 
Chen, in contrast, inherited a different context. Cross-
Strait economic ties had grown too numerous and too fast to 
be reversed, driven more by market dictates than by govern-
ment edicts. Influenced by the theories on globalization and 
(neo)functionalism, Chen regarded normalization of economic 
ties as a crucial step toward improving the overall cross-Strait 
relationship. Unlike Lee who had attempted to use the "Three 
Links" as bargaining chips to extract concessions from China, 
Chen favored the establishment of direct air and shipping links 
between Taiwan and the mainland. Chen also expected that 
the WTO. which both sides joined in late 2001, would provide 
a framework for conducting cross-Strait dialogue."' 
In a highly symbolic development, in August 2001, the Eco-
nomic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) decided to 
interdependence alone seldom can guarantee peace and often causes war, as 
rivals locked in a security dilemma seek to reduce their dependence (i.e., 
vulnerability) on each other. The case ·Of Britain and Germany prior to World 
War I and If hcst illustrates this. That is why peace should be ''triangulated." as 
two political ~cientists put it. Bruce Rus..o;;ett and John Oneal, Trianguh:zting Peace: 
Democrat)!, Interdependence, and International Organizatiom (New York: W.W. 
Norton. 2rxn ). 
10 Taiwan's President Chen Calls for Cross-Strait Dialogue Under WTO," 
Asia Pulse, Octoher 5, 2001. available at <http:/lsg.news.yahoo.com/011005116/ 
ljw5o.html>. Curiously, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, it was the PRC 
that was more fervent about establishing the Three Links as a step toward 
unification. For the first time. Beijing faces a Taiwan leader in Chen who openly 
favors the Three Links. Yet. the PRC now seems less interested in its old 
demand than in its new demand that Taiwan first must accept the "one China" 
principle before the lbrce Links can be discussed. Beijing always has favored 
direct trade and nondiscriminatory investment policy with Taiwan. Even after 
both sides joined the WTO. Beijing has insisted that future trade between these 
two WTO memhcrs must still be ronductcd under the "one China" framework. 
See Mure Dickie, "WfO Casts China-Taiwan Rivalry in New Light," Financial 
Times. November 15. 2001, p. 13. Transposing the zero~sum game of sovereignty 
onto the non-zero sum game of economics clearly complicates the latter. 
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replace the previous policy of "no haste, be patient" with a 
new policy of "aggressive opening, effective management" Uiji 
kaifang, youxwo guanli). In November 2001, Taiwan lifted 
longtime restrictions on direct investment in China, scrapping 
the US$50 million limit on individual investments in China, 
automatically approving projects of less than US$20 million, 
and allowing Taiwanese banks to transfer money directly to 
and from Chinese banks through special offices or offshore 
accounts. This effectively marked the end of the "no haste, be 
patient" policy." 
In January 2001. Taiwan launched the Three Mini-Links 
(xiao santong) by establishing the first direct shipping and 
transport links since 1949 between the ROC-controlled off-
shore islands of Quemoy (or Kinmen) and Matsu, and the 
PRC's ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou. Taiwan's Mainland 
Affairs Council (MAC) explained that this incremental policy 
was meant to lay a good foundation for the Three Big-Links-
the links between Taiwan proper and the mainland. However, 
Beijing accused Taipei of delaying the Three Big-Links, but 
was forced to go along since it had long wanted direct links.'2 
In sum, after reducing immediate tensions and stabilizing 
relations with Beijing in the first few months of his presidency, 
Chen Sui-bian turned his attention to normalizing cross-Strait 
economic ties as an important step toward normalizing cross-
Strait relations. However, Beijing spurned all his concessions 
and pleas, ostensibly because Chen refused to accept its "one 
China" precondition. Meanwhile, China ignored the fact that 
Chen had met two of China's demands-retracting former 
President Lee's "state-to-state" remarks and prohibitions 
against the Three Links. Therefore, the quest for a modus 
vivendi remained elusive and cross-Strait relations remained 
31 Mark Landler, "Taiwan Lifts Restrictions on Investment in China," New 
York Times, November 8. 2001, p. AJ. 
32 "China All But Ignores Mini~Links," Far Eastern Economic Review 
(online), November 8, 2001, available at <http://www.feer.com/2001!0111_08/ 
pOl cnntell.html>. 
113 
deadlocked. The next period bears witness to Chen, having 
made many concessions but not having been rewarded by 
Beijing, hardening his position, as domestic political considera-
tions in the ROC and the PRC set in. 
September 2001 to the Present: The Electoral and US Factors 
in Cross-Strait Relations 
Cross-Strait relations took a tum for the worse in Septem-
ber 2001. The two sides clashed over who should represent 
Taiwan at the informal APEC summit meeting in Shanghai. 
The Chen administration wanted to send Lee Yuan-tsu, a for-
mer ROC vice president, as Chen's stand-in, but Beijing 
refused to issue Lee a formal invitation on the ground that 
Taiwan could send only a high-ranking economics official to 
APEC (Lee had no known prior background in economics). 
This row resulted in Taiwan's absence from the summit. Anti-
Chinese rhetoric grew, as the races for the December 1 elec-
tions got under way. Some analysts surmised that Chen's 
APEC debacle was guided by electoral concerns to increase 
the DPP's share in the parliament. 
However, the PRC's policy toward Taiwan also was con-
strained by its domestic politics. As the jockeying to succeed 
the current leader, Jiang Zemin, got under way, policy toward 
Taiwan became an important consideration. Because contend-
ers and their supporters could afford to appear "soft" on 
Taiwan, a breakthrough in China's approach toward Taiwan 
appeared unlikely. 
One last important factor that helped to shape Chen's 
China policy was the Bush administration's new policies. As a 
candidate. George W. Bush defined China as a "strategic com-
petitor." not as a "strategic partner" as the Clinton administra-
tion had done. Once in power, Bush spent the first few 
months to fashion a China policy characterized by "de-
Clintonization," which, in many ways, translated into a tilt 
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Table 4. Cross-Strait Economic Statistics (1990-2000) 
A Trade 
Unit US$ million 
Taiwanese data Chinese data 
Indirect Indirect 
exports imports to PRC 
from Taiwan imports PRC 
Taiwan to from from exports to 
Year mainland mainland Total Taiwan Taiwan TotaJ 
1990 225.4 32.0 257.4 
1991 o,92K3 W7.5 7.525.8 363.9 59.5 423.4 
1992 9,6%B 747.1 10,443.9 588.1 69.X 657.9 
1993 12.727.8 1,015.5 13,743.3 1,293.3 146.2 1,493.5 
1994 14.653.0 1,858.7 16,511.7 14,084.4 2,242.2 16,327.0 
1995 17,898.2 3,091.3 20,989.5 14,7X3.9 3,098.1 17,882.0 
19% 19.14X.J 3.059.8 22,208.1 16.1X2.2 2,802.7 18,984.9 
1997 20.518.0 3,915.3 24,433.3 16,441.7 3,3%.5 19,838.2 
199X 18.380.1 4,110.5 22,490.6 16,629.6 3,869.0 20,499.2 
1999 21.221.3 4.526..1 25.747.6 19,528.5 3,950.1 23,4n.o 
2000 25,493.7 5,039.6 30,533.3 
Sources: Taiwanese data, based on Board of Foreign Trade (MOEA), Investment 
Commission (MOEA), Department of Economic Affairs of the Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC), from laipei Journal. June 2. 2000, p. 3; Chinese data, based on PRC 
Genernl Administration of Customs, Chirw's Customs Statirtic.~, from Sutter. 09. 
B. Thiwanese Investments in the PRC 
Unit US$ million 
Taiwanese data Chinese data 
$ share of Contracted Utilized 
total FDI Taiwancst= Taiwanese 
Number of in the FDJ in the FDI in lhe 
Cases Amount erojects PRC PRC PRC 
1990 1,103 15.2 890.0 222.4 
1991 237 174.2 1,735 13.4 1388.5 466.4 
1992 204 247.0 0,430 13.2 5,543.3 1.050.5 
1993 9,329 3.168.4 l0,94X 13.1 9,%4.9 3,138.6 
1994 934 962.2 6,247 13.1 5394.9 3,391.0 
1995 490 l.ll'i2.7 4,847 !3.0 S,M9.1 3.161.6 
1996 3H3 1,229.2 3,184 13.0 51,401.0 3,474.8 
19Y7 8,725 4.334 . .1 3,014 14.3 2,Xl4.5 32X9.4 
l<i'JS 1,284 2,034.6 2,970 15.0 2,981.7 2,915.2 
1999 488 1,252.7 2.499 14.8 3,374.4 2598.7 
2WO 3.108 13.9 4,041.9 2,2%.3 
Sources: Taiwanese data from Taipei Journal, June 2, 2(0), p. 3; C'hinese data, based 
on PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFERT). from 
Sutter. 07. 
toward Taiwan. Concrete examples include: (1) the State 
Department spokesman said that the Bush administration 
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would not repeat Clinton's "lbree No's" policy regarding 
Taiwan; (2) President Chen made an unprecedented "transit 
visit" to New York and met two dozen members of Congress-
with the Bush administration's blessing; (3) in April 2001, the 
Bush administration approved the sale of a robust package of 
arms to Taiwan that included four Kidd-class destroyers and 
eight diesel-powered submarines; and (4) in a TV interview, 
President Bush declared that the US would do "whatever it 
takes" to help Taiwan defend itself against Chinese attacks. 
Chen benefited from these diplomatic gains that resulted 
mainly from one great power's changing attitude about 
another. 
After the midair collision of a Chinese fighter with a US 
naval surveillance plane in April 2001, which sent US-PRC 
relations to a nadir, the PRC, with its WTO entry and Olym-
pics bid in mind, began to moderate its policy toward the US 
and Taiwan. 
Chen was cautious. Fresh from diplomatic victories 
("transit diplomacy" and arms sales), Chen enunciated his sec-
ond "five no's" (see table 2), aimed at assuaging Beijing's 
backlash. And in his National Day address, he said that 
Taiwan would make more effort to normalize relations with 
China." 
However, evident frustration and electoral considerations 
caused Chen to harden his position on the PRC's "one China" 
demand. While meeting former US Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen in November 2001, Chen categorically turned 
down Beijing's "one China" demand and appealed for talks 
between the rivals to begin without any preconditions.34 Chen 
maintained that Beijing's insistence on the "one China" princi-
ple as a precondition for resuming talks had become an obsta-
cle to dialogue. He explained that no document could be 
33 "ROC to Strive for Normal Relations with PRC: Chen," China Post 
October 11, 2001. 
-
14 
"Taiwan President Chen Rejects 'One China,'" Yahoo/News Asia, 
November L 2001, available at <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/01110111/ln26k.html>. 
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found that would corroborate that the "one China" principle, 
as defined by leaders in Beijing, was supported by the so-
called 1992 consensus. Because the CCP did not agree with 
the KMT government that "one China, each side has its own 
interpretation" was the consensus reached by both sides, there 
had been no agreement on the ''one China" issue.35 Conse-
quently, Chen talked about the "1992 spirit." 
As campaigns kicked into high gear in November 2001, to 
differentiate his party's stance from that of the KMT, Chen 
warned voters that accepting the so-called "1992 consensus" 
would run the risk of Beijing's claiming Taipei had accepted 
the "one country, two systems" scheme. The KMT accused 
Chen of being disingenuous. Nevertheless, more voters 
seemed to agree with Chen. 
The December 2001 legislative election results made the 
DPP the largest party in the parliament, although it still lacked 
a majority. Table 5 shows that, of the 225-seat Legislative 
Yuan, the DPP won 87 seats, up from 70 seats in 1998; the 
KMT's seat share dropped from 123 to 68: the PFP, competing 
for the first time, won 46 seats: the TSU, also running for the 
first time, won 13 seats; the NP managed to secure only one 
seat, down from 10; and 10 seats went to independents. The 
Pan-Green Coalition now controlled one hundred seats, within 
striking distance of 113, which would give it a legislative 
majority. 
The election results bolstered Chen's political capital and 
shattered Beijing's earlier strategy of courting Taiwan's oppo-
sition parties and simply waiting for Chen's term to expire. 
The DPP, now stronger, not weaker, had to be reckoned with. 
With his position more secured, Chen was unwilling to make 
further concessions on the "one China" issue. Chen's resis-
tance on the "one China" issue and Beijing's equally strong 
insistence on this demand means that cross-Strait relations, for 
35 "President Chen: 'One China' is the CCP's Excuse for Refusing 
Dialogue'' (in Chinese), China Times. November 2, 2001, available at <http:// 
ncws.chinatimes.com>. 
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Table 5. Taiwan's 201)1 Legislative Elections-Before 
and After 
Other/ 
KMT DPP PFP NP TSU independent Total 
2001 Legislative Yuan (LY) Elt'ilions 
1998 election vote shares 4tl.6% 29.0% 7 I 
1998 election ~ats won 12.1 70 NA I NA 21 225 
1998 election seat shares 54.7% 31.1% ~A 4.9 NA 9.3% J((I.(J% 
Seat<: prior to 2001 election 110 65 20 I NA 20 225 
Seat shares prior to 2001 clcttwn 4K9"'0 211.9% H.9% 4.4 NA R.9% HlO.O% 
2001 election candidate<; 'IX SJ 61 .1 
" 
144 458 
nnminatt:d 
2001 election vole <:han:s ( hefon: _11.3% 36.A% 20.3% 2.9 8.5% 0.5% 100.0% 
al!cJtment) 
2C(}J election vote shares (arter _,2.4% :n.S"In 21.0% 0.0 H.S% 0.0% JO(l.U% 
allotment) 
2001 election ~at~ won 
directly elected seflts (SNl V) 5~ 69 35 8 176 
allocated sc<Jts (PR) Jj 
" 
II 
' 
111 40 
Total !>e,t\s 
"" "' 
46 1.1 Ill 22-"i 
Seat sh<Jres _,.l_2% 3R.7% 20.4% 0.4 5.H% 4.4% [(()_()% 
Voter turnout 06.2% 
2(){)] County Mugisrratr aml Muvon 
F:lections 
1997 election positions won 8 12 NA NA 
' 
2.1 
2001 eledion candidate~ 2.1 22 6 3l< ~I 
nominated 
2001 election po.~1tions won y 9 2 2.1 
Voter turmmt 66-'l% 
Sources: C!\'N_o!m, Elrction Watch <http:l/www.cnn.comiWORLD/election.watch/asiapcU 
taiwan.1.html>, CIA, The World Ful"lhook 2001 <http://www.cia.gov/ciafpublications/facthooklgcos! 
tw.html>, Catherine H~1eh. "Campaign Dominated by Familiar Faces," Taipei Journal. Novcm~r 
16. 20(!1, p. 2. and Myru Lu. "Voter~ Give Rulin_e: Party Le?,is\ative Advantage," Taipt'i Journal, 
Ucccmher 7, 2001. pp. \-2. 
the near future, will remain in a stalemate, without reaching a 
modus vivendi. 
Assessing Chen's Cross-Strait Poliq 
Assessing Chen's cross-Strait policy requires an acknowl-
edgement that epochal politicians, such as Chen, often seek to 
balance their idealistic (long-term) goals (e.g., becoming 
"Taiwan's Nixon" to make a ·'journey of peace" to China or 
winning the Nobel Peace Prize) with their rational (short-
term) goal of getting reelected. To the extent the pursuit of 
II R 
long-term goals helps or complements the short-term objec-
tive, the politician can pursue both. But if the pursuit of the 
former interferes with the latter, the politician is likely to opt 
for self-preservation. Chen's cross-Strait policy during the first 
twenty-two months of his administration exhibits such tensions 
among his various objectives. 
It also is important to discuss Chen's cross-Strait policy in a 
larger political context. For the most part, the early months of 
the Chen administration had been a humbling educational 
experience for the first DPP president. The Chen administra-
tion's overall performance can best be described as medio-
cre.'" However, this checkered score card resulted from many 
factors: a constitutional no-man's land, featuring a DPP presi-
dent facing off with a KMT -controlled legislature; inexperi-
ence; inability to reach out; pressures from certain DPP 
ideologues; boycotts by opposition parties; severe economic 
downturns; capital exodus as a result of globalization; Beijing's 
stonewalling; and so on. The remainder of this chapter offers a 
preliminary assessment of Chen's cross-Strait policy. 
Accomplishments 
Establishment of yardsticks is required before there can be 
discussions about the accomplishments and failures of Chen's 
cross-Strait policy. However, regardless of such measures, suc-
cess seemed remote due to Beijing's intense distrust of Chen 
1<1 One or Taiwan's leading English newspapers, Taipe; Times, on May 20, 
2001. published a series of articles to examine the first anniversary of the Chen 
Shui-hian administration. The titles of these "one year on., articles are 
illustrative: "Politics-Position toward China Seen to he Hardening," "National 
Security-Cross-Strait Relations Are as Chilly as Ever," '·Foreign Affairs-No 
Pitfalls, Some Plaudits. Little Change for Foreign Ministry," ''Politics-DPP 
Wrestles with Authority,'' "Politics-Embattled Vice President Faces Up to 
Tough Test," "Politics-After Fumbles, Cabinet Thes to Find Its Way.·· 
"Politics-Just Getting Started," ''Politics-A Simple Ca-.e of Bad Luck.'' These 
articles can be found at <http://www.taipeitimes.corn!ncws/2001/05/20/storyl>, 
followed by document numbers ranging from 0000086565 to (){)()()()86587. 
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and the DPP. Tbis partly explains why, despite Chen's numer-
ous goodwill measures and concessions, Beijing still chooses to 
emphasize what yet must be done (Chen's acceptance of the 
"one China" precondition), rather than what has been done 
(foreswearing independence, and jettisoning the "no haste. be 
patient" policy and the "state-to-state" formula). In effect, 
Beijing's policy of "listening to his words, and watching his 
actions" has sentenced Chen to an indefinite ''probation." 
Neither does it advance the PRC's own unification agenda or 
cross-Strait reconciliation. 
Yet, cross-Strait relations are so complex, emotionally 
charged, and the players' interests and perspectives often so 
diametrically opposed, that any small accomplishments, rather 
than big breakthroughs, should be the proper yardsticks. In 
Chen's case, he can argue that expectations for him were so 
low that he easily could outdo the KMT, which could not 
"solve" the cross-Strait problem in its fifty-five years in power. 
Chen's pro-independence stance and party label are his lia-
bilities. But his personal background-being a native-born 
Taiwanese after 1949, therefore, having no connection to the 
bitter civil war between the CCP and the KMT, should be a 
major asset. In many ways, he is in a unique position to make 
a clean break with the past. 
Table 6 summarizes the main differences between Lee and 
Chen on their cross-Strait policies. To be sure, there are 
important differences in both substance and style between Lee 
and Chen.'7 However, there are also important continuities, 
such as the primacy given to safeguarding the ROC's saver-
.li For example, one can make meaningful distinctions between Lee's own 
outlooks from 1991-95 and from 1995-2000. In 1991, the earlier Lee abrogated 
the Temporary Provisions (tacitly recognizing the PRC as the legal authority 
governing the mainland), convened the National Unification Council. and 
approached cross-Strait relations in accordance with the National Unification 
G-uidelines. This lasted until Lee issued his own six points a~ a n::sponse to Jiang 
Zemin's eight points. The later Lee, starting with his 1995 visit to Cornell 
University and the PRC's military intimidation, was more assertive and gradually 
movctl away from the KMTs traditional pro-unification stance. 
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Table 6. Taiwan's Evolving Cross-Strait Policy 
Definition of 
cross-strait rela-
tron~ 
Premise of cco-
rwmio:: policy 
l'rade and invest-
ment 
Tnmsportation 
links 
Tradeoffs between 
pragmatic diplo-
macv and cross-
Strait relationship 
Military deter-
r~·ncc: peace 
through strength? 
From "one countn. two political 
entities" (a In National Unification 
Guidelines) to -spetial state-to-state 
rclntion~" 
Economic dependcm:e on the main-
lund undennim.·~ nationill security 
"Nn ha~tc. Oe patient" 
"'lhree Links'' were not imple-
mented: ~orne ad hoc ml!asures 
(e.g .. off~horc transshipment center) 
'Transits." "golf diplornacy.-
"alumni reunion·· to countries th:'lt 
recognize the PRC; more willing to 
engage in diplomllliL· tug-uf-w<1r 
with PRC 
Yes 
People-to--people More L:<Jutiou<> and re-strictive 
cxchunge 
Chen 
From di~wning "state-to-~ta!c" the-
ory to "polilit:al integration" 
Normalization of cross-Strait eco-
nomic tie~ enhances national 
:;ccunty 
'"Active opening. effective manage-
ment" 
""lhree Mini-Linb" inaugurated. 
paving way for the llucc Big-Links 
W/0 cat<ll)'st~1 
More ..:ircumspect in visiting coun-
tric~ which have diplomatic ties with 
Beijing; 
l.e,-.s likely to engage in "dollar 
Jiplumacy" 1o wunter Beijing 
Yl·~ 
Further relaxations (e.g., mainland 
toUiists) under study 
eignty and de facto independence, to military deterrence and 
the promotion of cross-Strait dialogue. 
Another peculiar continuity should be mentioned. Partly 
due to their negotiating style and partly due to their aversion 
to taking risk, Beijing leaders often have clung to principled 
positions and failed to seize the opportunities that arise with a 
new leader in Taiwan to meet him half way. Rather, a pro-
tracted war of attrition only served to alienate the Taiwan 
leader. who had to consider domestic politics. When Lee 
Teng-hui first succeeded to the presidency in 19XX, Beijing 
invested great hope in him. Lee sought to normalize relations 
with China by establishing the National Unification Council, 
enacting the National Unification Guidelines, terminating the 
Temporary Provisions (thereby ending hostilities against 
Beijing and tacitly accepting the PRC's control on the main-
land), and offering to meet PRC leaders in international set-
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tings and to make a journey of peace to the mainland. 
However, twelve years later, Beijing heaped the most vitriolic 
invectives on Taiwan's first democratically elected president. 
Beijing's inflexibility bears some responsibility for this lost 
opportunity. Beijing's present treatment of Chen, ignoring his 
goodwill and concessions and focusing only on agreement on 
the most difficult condition (one China), risks repeating the 
experience with Lee Teng-hui. Is Beijing still waiting for a 
perfect future partner? 
Chen's first accomplishment on cross-Strait policy was his 
promises to forsake de jure independence, contingent upon 
China's refrain from using force against Taiwan. The five no's 
in his inaugural speech served to reassure Beijing, Washington, 
and the jittery post-election Taiwan public. Consequently, 
cross-Strait relations. although still not tension-free, entail no 
immediate danger. 
The second accomplishment of Chen's cross-Strait policy is 
the "political integration" formula, which allows the various 
parties in Taiwan to search for a common denominator, and 
again reassures Beijing that he at least believes that unification 
is possible. 
The third accomplishment is Chen's more realistic eco-
nomic statecraft vis-a-vis the PRC than has been practiced in 
the past. How the new policy can be implemented to safe-
guard Taiwan's security remains to be seen. 
The fourth accomplishment is the enhanced US commit-
ment to Taiwan's democracy and security. Henry Hyde, chair-
man of the US House of Representative's Committee on 
International Relations, praised Taiwan as a beacon of 
Chinese democracy. Hyde's comments suggest that more 
American decision makers now regard Taiwan's democracy as 
an asset (a catalyst to democratize China) to the US, rather 
than as a liability. and believe that defending this democracy is 
in the strategic interest of the US. 
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Deficiencies 
Despite Chen's conciliatory rhetoric and unilateral conces-
sions, cross-Strait relations have experienced no break-
throughs since he became the president. Cross-Strait dialogue 
has not resumed. Even issues of mutual benefit, such as trade 
and other economic ties, remain unregulated. Taipei has not 
been able to get support or assistance from Beijing on matters 
such as the Three Mini-Links or the anticipated Three Big 
Links. The key obstacle, of course, is the inability by both 
sides to find a mutually acceptable formula that will satisfy 
Beijing's demand for cross-Strait talks (Taipei argues there 
should be no preconditions for such talks). 
In light of the ROC's and the PRC's imminent entry into 
the WTO, Taiwan's preparatory work for a new relationship 
with the mainland appeared inadequate. Assessment of the 
impact of Chlna's WTO membership on Taiwan remains inar-
ticulate. No system has been established to ensure that 
Taiwan's westward capital exodus will contribute to Taiwan's 
prosperity and not lead to the island's deindustrialization. 
Whither? 
Chen's cross-Strait policy faces six hard realities: First, de 
jure independence is both impossible and risky. No great 
power will support it, and, if it were proclaimed, Chlnese 
attack would be almost certain. Second, continued de facto 
independence also depends greatly upon the great powers' 
interests and determination. Third, economic interdepen-
dence between the mainland and Taiwan most likely will con-
tinue to grow. The mainland serves as a good hinterland for 
many Taiwanese businesses. For Taiwan, this promises both 
impetus for continued prosperity and limitation on political 
choices. Fourth, if Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" 
goes well, there could be greater international pressure on 
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Taipei to yield to its application in Taiwan. Fifth, although 
many countries support the ROC's international participation, 
they are un\\illing to do so by directly challenging the PRC. 
The diplomatic "regret" over Taiwan's nonparticipation in the 
2001 APEC meeting serves as a vivid example. Hence, until 
the final talk between Taiwan and the mainland concerning 
Taiwan's status can (ever) happen, Taiwan's international par-
ticipation may well be a topic of cross-Strait dispute. Given 
that Taiwan is an important economic power and economic 
matters are usually positive-sum, Taipei should insist on 
greater participation in keystone international economic orga-
nizations (KIEO ), such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. Sixth, China's future political develop-
ment is relevant to Taiwan's own political future. A demo-
cratic China may or may not bless an independent Taiwan, but 
then Taiwan may want to voluntarily join a future democratic 
China. Conversely, an authoritarian China will constantly 
pose a security threat to Taiwan. 
The Chen Shui-bian administration now seems to better 
understand these parameters. Curiously, the DPP's stance on 
independence in some ways is the mirror image of the PRC's 
stance on the use of force as a trump card: The DPP claims 
that it must reserve the right to declare de jure independence 
in order to safeguard de facto independence. The PRC claims 
that it must reserve the right to use force against Taiwan in 
order to achieve peaceful unification. It seems that a 
noncoerced modus vivendi would be based on the trade-off, or 
mutual renunciation, of these two options. It is unlikely that 
these options would be used, but it is very likely that they will 
continue to cause the other party's suspicion. This modus 
vivendi does not need to be the ultimate solution to cross-
Strait relations, but it should have international endorsement. 
For the ROC, whose main concern in the maintenance of 
de facto independence (but not the declaration of de jure inde-
pendence, because it is impossible), the recommended modus 
vivendi would enhance the status quo: The Taipei government 
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would exercise complete autonomy in all the territories under 
its control, and its participation in international affairs would 
be significantly increased, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. 
For the PRC, whose main concern is Taiwan's permanent 
separation from the mainland, the arrangement would 
embrace some type of loose political association between the 
mainland and Taiwan. Since most people of Taiwan oppose 
the father-son type of relationship inherent in the "one coun-
try, two systems" scheme, the common political association 
would be a newly constructed minimalist, overarching entity, 
symbolizing national unity (with its head-of-state rotated by 
the heads-of-state of constituent states) and coordinating the 
constituent states' (PRC's and ROC's) foreign affairs. Provi-
sions also should be made so that a constituent state could 
withdraw from the association, if a bona fide effort had been 
made within it. 
Of course, Taiwan's modern history shows that Taiwan's 
destiny often was decided by the great powers, with little input 
from Taiwan's people. The most important difference today is 
that Taiwan is a democracy, whose people should be given a 
right to responsibly choose their future. 
